CCG持续对企业全球化、 “走出去”和“引进来” 展开双向研究，以当前国际背景下的中美贸易、国际贸易、来华投资、对外投资、数字贸易为主题，进行分析、研究与解读。CCG 不断寻求更多力量来推动全球自由贸易发展，率先推动中国加入 CPTPP，并发布系列研究报告。此外，CCG 课题组常年编写国内唯一的“企业国际化蓝皮书”《中国企业全球化报告》，并在中国社会科学文献出版社出版。CCG还研发出版了《世界华商发展报告》、《大潮澎湃——中国企业“出海”四十年》、China Goes Global 、The Globalization of Chinese Enterprises 等企业全球化研究中英文图书系列。CCG还创办了国内最具影响力的专注于企业全球化发展的“中国企业全球化论坛”，围绕国际贸易与投资相关国际议题设置多场分论坛，云集国内外极具影响力的跨国公司领袖、驻华大使、前政要官员、国际组织与商会负责人、国际顶尖智库专家及知名学者深度研讨，已发展成为推动企业全球化发展的国际高端论坛。

• 中美贸易
• 国际贸易
• 来华投资
• 对外投资
• 数字贸易

• 

  何伟文：中国应坚持维护WTO多边机制

  专家简介 何伟文，全球化智库（CCG）高级研究员。 在分析中美贸易问题的现状和发展态势前，我们需要先了解这次中美磋商的真正性质。这次提法是磋商，不是谈判，说明是在国家元首代表层面商量，为谈判定调，是谈判的前奏。目前关于中美贸易磋商进展的消息很有限，但从美方提出的清单可以看出其心态和态势： 美方“漫天要价”作为谈判筹码 美国现在采取的是大棒子高压谈判策略，它所体现出的强势实际是美国采取的一种手段，美国现在要求越高，它越好往下谈。 美方试图占据道义制高点 美国第一项要求即是要削减2000亿顺差，过去特朗普说减少1000亿，人们已经觉得很离谱，现在要求每年减1000亿，到2020年共减少2000亿，这代表什么意思？美国是否想争取道义上的制高点，根据这个让我们削减关税，提出市场准入？但这个要价没有科学依据，因为美国没有逆差是市场形成的，不是政府政策造成的。而且要价太高，世界上没有哪个国家会接受这样的条件，更不用说中国。但美国这个大棒子举出来是和我们谈判的筹码，要价越高越好谈，对他越有利，如果他开始要价就很低，对美国而言就很难获得优势。 单边主义仍是主导思想 从美国提出的八点要求可以看出，美国仍在施行单边主义，要求中国从WTO撤诉。而美国自己其实也没有理会WTO的存在，它只是单方面要求中国撤诉，但却没有表示要撤销301调查。美国自己在进行贸易限制却不容许中国向WTO发起贸易诉讼，这就是单边主义，无视多边规则的表现。 美方中心目标是中国的发展权 美方提出的八点要求中有四点其实是针对“中国制造2025”，是希望限制“中国制造2025”。比如说，要中国政府停止对重点领域进行补贴，要求中国保护知识产权，限制“中国制造2025”项下产品对美国的出口，限制中国在美国敏感领域进行企业并购。 那么基于现在美国表现出的姿态和特点，我们应该如何来应对呢？我觉得，目前做到以下几点很重要： 一、我们要始终坚持WTO的多边原则，世贸组织的规则不可动摇，我们必须依靠世贸组织的体制解决这些问题。不仅仅是关于301调查和25%关税的问题，而是在中国的贸易行为、在知识产权的保护上，我们都应该依据世贸组织的规定，而不是按照美国的意思。按照美中贸委会、中国美国商会的报告，关于知识产权以及敏感技术转让等问题，中美双方可以根据WTO的规定来谈。所以我们现在必须向美国提出WTO的规则和框架，谈判也不能抛开这个框架。这等于是对我们自己进行保护，在美国不理会WTO的时候我们一定要坚持WTO的原则。 二、中美在市场准入方面可以进行双边谈判，而且有谈判空间。在市场准入方面，美国所提的对等关系是有问题的，即便是讲究对等关系我们也需要依靠世贸的规则。世贸中强调的互惠、非歧视等并不是指相互间降低市场准入的对等关系，而是不同发展程度的国家降低的程度是存在差异的。所以，并不存在美国对我们设置2.5%的关税，我们也只能向他们征收2.5%的关税。这都是通过多边谈判实现的。如果我们离开了世贸的规则跟美国谈关税水平，我们很难谈清楚。如果没有世贸规则的存在，我们很难判定美国的做法是错的。但有WTO的规则我们就可以依靠它来做判断。但降低关税对我们而言是需要的，符合我们开放的目标，我们整体应该朝这个方向努力。 三、关于“中国制造2025”，我们应该化消极的一面为积极的一面。近期我们成立了国家集成电路产业投资基金，欢迎外资加入，这是很好的做法。最近，我们的一些行动也是在将“中国2025”的优惠措施普及到外商，这些实际行动都是积极的，对美国企业也会有好处。 四、对于美国对中国的限制，我们可以采取相当的举措。美国要对“中国制造2025”项下出口的产品进行限制，我们也可以对他们的产品进行限制。中国对美国敏感领域的并购美国可以限制，美国在中国敏感领域的并购我们也可以限制，当然这对我们可能不合算，但可以采取其他的方式。总之，我们和美国之间是可以谈判的，而不是一味地气愤。 五、我们需要做好两手准备。美国提到的2018年7月1日前要撤诉可能是在给我们释放信号，即如果届时不撤诉美国就要落实关税。特朗普提及谈判若不顺利关税还是要施加，而他的想法随时会付诸实践，我们需要对此做好准备。我们现在不讲贸易战，只讲贸易摩擦，因为贸易战还没有发生。即便是施加了500亿的关税，这也只是局部的贸易战。但我们不能没有任何准备，只有准备好我们才是占据主动的。所以，我们应当做两手准备，准备充分后就能占据主动。 六、我们一定要积极地减少政治对贸易问题的干扰。现在美国的贸易问题实际是政治问题，包括美国对周围的战略定位、美国的国内政治等。在减少2000亿顺差的问题上，我们应该让专业人士去谈，美方也是精通贸易的人来谈判，这更能解决贸易差的问题。因为现在美方对贸易逆差的责难，听起来都不专业。但现在为什么这么强调贸易问题呢？这其实是美国国内政治的问题。美国不认可中国的社会主义道路，也不认可中国的十九大。企图借贸易问题通过谈判解决政治问题是不可能的，中国十九大和社会主义道路是不能谈判的。所以，我们应当尽可能地将贸易问题和政治问题分离。 七、媒体宣传应保证客观公正。现在很多媒体的宣传都不符合事实，在一定程度上误导。所以，我们的舆论导向很重要。媒体首先应当科学地宣传，无论是涉及重大的对外问题还是具体的经济问题，我们都要强调报道的科学性，如果缺乏依据就很难说服人。二是媒体不应该追逐风头，为了引人眼球而出现离谱的东西。我们专家讲话也是要实事求是，尽量减少煽情的东西或减少一些自己没有把握的话。 总而言之，违反世贸规则发起的301调查和施加关税是不被允许的，在这些问题上我们不能向美国妥协。而“中国制造2025”涉及中国的主权和发展权，更是不可触碰的底线。在接下来的谈判中，我们应当分清是非再采取恰当的回应。 （本文根据作者在全球化智库（CCG）2018年5月7日举办的“从中美磋商研判中美经贸形势智库圆桌会”上的发言整理，未经本人审阅，转载请注明出处）

  2018年5月15日
• 

  梁国勇：中美贸易战走向的四个关键维度

  梁国勇，全球化智库（CCG）特邀高级研究员、联合国贸发会议经济事务高级官员

  2018年5月8日
• 

  How Trump Led the U.S. and China to the Brink of a Trade War

  Chinese finance officials had high expectations entering the first major meeting with new American counterparts last summer. President Donald Trump had feted Chinese President Xi Jinping at his Mar-a-Lago resort a few months earlier, suggesting the two nations would enjoy warmer ties than his campaign-trail attacks had implied. Those hopes were dashed by Trump’s Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross nearly as soon as the July 19 talks began. Mnuchin told his visitors that he wouldn’t sign a traditional joint statement to end the meeting. Nor would there be a joint news conference, a ritual moment relished by the Chinese. Ross, a longstanding China hawk, proceeded to lecture the foreign delegation. The meeting ended in confusion, accelerating a downward spiral in economic ties with China. Now, as Mnuchin and Ross try to head off an all-out trade war, their talks in Beijing are made harder because of the Trump administration’s failure to nurture ties with China and the White House’s warring factions on economic policy. The consequences of the collapse of the formal economic dialog still reverberate. Communication between U.S. and Chinese officials was reduced to a trickle, culminating in Trump threatening last month to slap tariffs on as much as $150 billion in Chinese imports. “We are looking to change the discussion on trade,” Mnuchin said at the Milken Institute’s Global Conference in Los Angeles on Monday. “From the first meeting in Mar-a-Lago, President Trump has been very clear that the major issue was the trade imbalance, that we wanted to have reciprocal trade.” This account of how relations frayed between the world’s two largest economies is based on interviews with more than a dozen current and former U.S. officials. Chinese officials did not respond to requests for comment. Partners in Trade China and Nafta nations are America’s largest trading partners What Trump Wants Mnuchin and Ross landed Thursday morning in Beijing and will meet Chinese officials in the afternoon and for dinner, the State Department said. Talks are set to resume Friday before the officials depart China’s capital in the evening. China’s government won’t accept any U.S. preconditions for negotiations such as abandoning its long-term advanced manufacturing ambitions or narrowing the trade gap by $100 billion, a senior government official, who asked not to be named, said late Wednesday. At a meeting in the last week, some senior advisers to the president indicated they weren’t sure what Trump would need to think he got a good trade deal, according to two people familiar with the matter. And another goal of the trip is for the U.S. to show China some respect for its help in pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Mnuchin said the administration is “very concerned about forced transfers of technology” and “forced joint ventures” for U.S. companies seeking to do business in China. “These are all the issues we will be discussing,” he said at the Milken conference. Chinese officials are open to discussing issues including technology transfers, widening access to China’s markets, increasing U.S. imports and Chinese industrial policy, said He Weiwen, a senior fellow  of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) in Beijing and a former Commerce Ministry official. They won’t bargain on narrowing Trump’s proposed tariffs or reducing the tariff rates, he said -- China has demanded the tariffs be withdrawn altogether. “China needs to see sincerity from the U.S.,” he said. “And only by withdrawing the 301 investigation and the $150 billion tariff threats can the U.S. show they are bona fide.” Trump “wants a lot from China,” said Wang Tao, chief China economist at UBS Group AG in Hong Kong. “It covers a very wide range and it is confusing.” Who Blinks? China’s overall trade and current account surpluses have fallen significantly as a percentage of its gross domestic product since 2007, economists say. China’s current account surplus declined from 9.9 percent of GDP in 2007 to 1.4 percent in 2017, according to the International Monetary Fund. And China correctly believes that the U.S. current account deficit, of which trade is the biggest part, reflects a persistently low savings rate relative to investment, said Jim O’Neill, former chief economist at Goldman Sachs Group. The New York Times reported Monday that the Chinese will reject two expected demands from the U.S. delegation: that they cut their trade surplus with the U.S. by $100 billion and curb government subsidies for advanced industries such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Cutting the Chinese trade surplus without raising the U.S. savings rate would simply shift the surplus to other countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, O’Neill said. And China won’t abandon its Made in China 2025 plan to subsidize advanced industries, said He, the former Commerce Ministry official. But some experts are skeptical China’s government will stand its ground. “If the U.S. pushes hard, the Chinese will blink,” said Ian Bremmer, president of Eurasia Group and the author of a newly published book, “Us Vs. Them: The Failure of Globalism.” “If they have to give an openness of markets they will,” he said. “The Chinese think they’re winning long-term as long as they keep stability.” The stakes could hardly be higher. Together, the U.S. and China account for more than half a trillion dollars in commerce. Companies from Apple Inc. to Ford Motor Co. rely substantially on Chinese suppliers, giving Beijing an additional pressure point to retaliate against U.S. tariffs. Trump’s predecessor, President Barack Obama, practiced what’s known as “strategic patience” with China, exerting little public pressure on the country to rapidly open its markets to foreign competition. Even Trump’s political opponents give him credit for trying a different approach. “One of the reasons that things are better is frankly that he has gotten a little tougher on China,” Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer of New York said Monday at the Milken conference. No Contacts Before the July 19 meeting, Mnuchin had held more than a dozen phone calls and meetings with Chinese officials. Afterward, there were few publicly announced meetings between Mnuchin and the Chinese. He met twice with then-outgoing People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan on the sidelines of major international summits. Chinese officials, accustomed to robust engagement with their U.S. counterparts, gradually grew more alarmed after the July meeting. Vice Premier Liu He made a trip to Washington in February with three requests for the Trump administration: Establish a new economic dialog, name a point person on China issues and hand over a specific list of economic demands. The U.S. did none of those things. Instead, Trump responded by imposing tariffs first on aluminum and steel imports -- the U.S. accuses China of dumping the metals into global markets, hurting domestic suppliers -- and then proposing levies on a list of more than 1,300 Chinese exports. Within the Trump administration, there was meanwhile internal confusion and rivalry over the approach to China. Ross had led U.S. efforts to secure trade concessions from China in the early months of Trump’s presidency. But since he failed to close a deal with the Chinese on steel imports, Mnuchin and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer have assumed more responsibility for the relationship. Inside the White House, Trump’s two closest economic advisers hold disparate views on trade. Larry Kudlow, director of the National Economic Council, is a free-trade advocate who has repeatedly described Trump’s tariffs as mere proposals rather than a certainty. White House trade adviser Peter Navarro is a hawk who in 2011 published a book titled “Death by China” that portrays the country as a military and economic enemy. “It’s good to have a diversity of opinion and when we go over there we will have one voice,” Mnuchin said in an interview with Bloomberg Television on Monday. A breakthrough by Mnuchin’s delegation, which also includes Navarro, Lighthizer and Kudlow, would soothe relations between the countries and calm financial markets that have been in turbulence over the prospect of a trade war. But the outcome is uncertain if the U.S. sticks to hard-line demands the Chinese won’t accept. Before they departed, Lighthizer tempered expectations. The U.S. and China could “spend the next year developing how we deal with each other over a period of time,” Lighthizer said, adding that the two countries are in the “early stages” of that process. Asked what success in his talks would look like, Mnuchin said in the Bloomberg Television interview: “You’ll know it when you see it.” ‘Escalation Mode’ “The risk is that we remain stuck in escalation mode and we don’t shift to negotiations and defining what we want,” said Michael Smart, managing director at Rock Creek Global Advisors and former trade counsel to Democrats on the Senate Finance Committee. “We simply need to map out a plan and need to bring our allies in. We can’t do this alone.” At the dawn of Trump’s presidency, the Chinese had reason for at least cautious optimism. Trump had attacked China on the campaign trail as an economic parasite on the U.S. But in one of his administration’s first official actions toward the country, the Treasury Department in April 2017 declined to accuse China of currency manipulation, keeping U.S. policy status quo. The Xi summit followed, where the two leaders bonded at Trump’s Palm Beach resort. China offered minor concessions welcomed by the Americans, allowing more U.S. beef imports and opening its financial sector to greater U.S. investment. It was the sort of incremental progress the formal Comprehensive Economic Dialogue was designed to encourage. But by July, Trump was dissatisfied. He didn’t want incremental advances. He wanted a wholesale overhaul of the relationship, with the goal of closing the U.S.’s $337 billion trade deficit with China -- by far the largest of any American trading partner, and a major irritant to the president. Frustrating Dialogue The economic dialog, meanwhile, had itself come to be regarded inside and outside of Treasury as a resource-intensive exercise heavy on style and ritual and light on accomplishments -- and not just by Trump’s political appointees. “There was definitely frustration that we weren’t always making progress,” said Nathan Sheets, chief economist for PGIM Fixed Income, who served as Treasury undersecretary for international affairs in the Obama administration until 2017. “In the years that I was at Treasury, I saw an increased concern about the lack of progress in certain areas in terms of Chinese economic reforms, particularly business climate issues in China.” But without the formal dialog, communications between U.S. and Chinese officials lack routine and coordination. Trump’s brash approach to negotiations, honed in the rough-and-tumble world of New York real estate, meanwhile clashes with Xi’s cautious strategy to open China to global market forces. Trump’s own trip to China in November was rich in ceremony; Xi flattered his guest with a banquet in the Forbidden City. The business deals the U.S. president announced, however, were almost entirely non-binding agreements that would take years to bear fruit, if ever. Any deal that Mnuchin and his delegation strikes may be just as underwhelming, U.S. trade experts worry -- and once Trump realizes it, a trade war could be unavoidable. From Bloomberg，2018-5-3

  2018年5月7日
• 

  丁一凡：贸易逆差？美国剪全世界羊毛时可不这么说

  丁一凡，全球化智库（CCG）特邀高级研究员，北京外国语大学亿阳讲席教授。

  2018年5月3日
• 

  He Weiwen: WTO Rules Based Talks the Only Solution to China-U.S. Trade Tensions

  He Weiwen, a senior fellow at Center for China and Globalization(CCG). Following weeks of trade tension between China and the US, US President Donald Trump said on April 24 that he will send a delegation headed by Treasury Secretary Mnuchin and USTR Robert Lighthizer to Beijing for talks. The move immediately received a welcome response from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The escalation of China-US trade tension over the past weeks has caused great anxiety among the business community in both countries and the world at large. The USTR announcement of a 25% tariff on $50 billion of imports from China, based on its Section 301 investigation on Chinese practices on technology transfer, was met with a strong counter-measure from the Chinese government 13 hours later, with a 25% tariff on $50 billion worth of imports from the US. Also, China immediately referred the US 301 investigation and the tariffs to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of WTO. President Trump then asked the USTR for an additional tariffs on $100 billion of imports from China. This only resulted in an even stronger resolution from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce to “fight to the finish”. The trade tension extended to the technology and investment areas when the USDOC on April 16 banned US companies from supplying chips to ZTE for 7 years, and the FCC suggested on April 19 a ban on buying Chinese telecom products. Meanwhile, the US Treasury Department is busy finding a new legal basis to block Chinese high-tech M&A in the US. 301 Investigation and Tariffs Violate WTO Rules There have been complaints from US business on China’s practices in tech transfer, IPR protection, and equal competition. These have been the subject of bilateral dialogues and joint efforts by both governments for years. They could well be handled under the bilateral or WTO framework. The USTR Section 301 investigation report cited cases offered by the US China Business Council (USCBC), which comprises of the leading American multinationals operating in China. According to the USCBC China business environment survey 2017, 81% of member respondents said that they had no compulsory tech transfer problems in China, while 19% answered yes. Of this 19%, 67% said that the transfer requirement was from Chinese businesses, 33% said it was from the Chinese central government, and 25% said it was from the local government. The survey gave no concrete evidence on who forced which US companies to transfer what technology in what project. As a result, the Section 301 investigation report also failed to give any hard, concrete evidence. Even if we take that into account, it accounted for less than one fifth of total US companies, and the Chinese central government (no hard evidence here either) accounted for one third of that. Hence, it is a limited issue, not the representative of bilateral trade as a whole. We could easily have those issues resolved at the WTO. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under the WTO covers issues of technology transfer, layout design of integrated circuits, patent, industrial design, and copyrights. It is based on recognition of all the international treaties under the World Industrial Property Organization (WIPO), and on three WTO principles: national treatment, most favored nation, and balanced protection. Hence, international rules and standards are there for practically all the US businesses. However, the USTR did not follow that path. Instead, he launched the Section 301 investigation, in violation of the WTO rules. Clause 23 of the WTO “Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes” stipulates that: “Members shall…not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred [and] shall make any such determination consistent with the findings of the panel of Appellate Body report”. It means that only the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism has the right to determine if China is in violation of relevant WTO rules. The US, as a leading member of the WTO, signed the Understanding. In 1998, USTR launched a Section 301 investigation on the EU. EU then turned to the WTO, and the US lost the case. The USTR then promised not to resort to unilateral Section 301 moves any more. Twenty years later, the USTR forgot its promise and made the same violation. Unilateral tariffs are banned under WTO rules, as tariff levels are set by multilateral negotiations, not by unilateral government decisions. Multilateral Trade Mechanism under Threat Having violated WTO rules, the USTR has gone further, forcing other countries to give the US “good bargains”. It used the steel and aluminum tariffs to this effect in KORUS renegotiation. South Korea agreed to increase the US automobile quota to South Korea to escape tariffs. If China makes this same mistake and negotiates with the US under pressure from tariffs and the Section 301 investigation, the unilateral violation would be legitimized, and the WTO rules would be useless. Then all the countries can do whatever they want to impose tariffs, or other restrictive measures. World trade would fall into chaos, creating significant risks in the world economy. In 1930, the US adopted the Smoot-Hawley Act to considerably raised tariff levels across the board, which hit an average of 53.2% in 1932, to protect the American jobs. Then Canada, the UK, and France retaliated with equal tariff hikes. As a result, US exports shrank by 66%, and imports shrank by 62% from 1929-1933, and world trade fell by 66%. The US unemployment rate shot up to 30%, the opposite of what the Act hoped to achieve. The USTR’s Section 301 investigation and tariffs have posed a major challenge to the authority and effectiveness of the multilateral trade mechanism established after the end of World War II. The current China-US trade tension is not only a bilateral showdown, still less a tech transfer issue, but a major struggle between unilateral protectionism and multilateral free trade. Tariff Measures Targeting Made in China 2025 A close look at the tariff checklist leads shows it has nothing to do with the Section 301 investigation which addresses technology transfer and IPR, not products. The list includes iron/nonalloy steel semi-finished products, central heating boilers, textile printing machinery, cooking stoves, dishwashing machines, and sowing machine needless. No one would believe that China needs to force tech transfer for those very low-end items. Further down the list, the main categories include nuclear reactors and parts, marine purpose internal combustion piston engines, and aircraft. Not a single one of these was covered in the Section 301 investigation report. However, they fall within the ten focal industries identified in the Made in China 2025 plan. Peter Navarro, Chairman of the National Trade Committee, abandoned all pretense when he said in a Bloomberg interview that “the target” of President Trump’s tariff order is certainly the focus industries in Made in China 2025. His remarks were later confirmed by the USTR. China, as a sovereign state, has its legal right to development. The Trump Administration could dispute specific measures within Made in China 2025, but not the Made in China plan itself. China never challenges President Trump’s Tax Act, because this is a domestic issue of the US. It would be naive to think that the moonshot tariffs and other tech restrictions could stop or slow down the Made in China 2025 plan. As the Chinese and American high-tech sectors are closely interrelated in the global supply chain which also spans Europe, Japan and the rest of Asia, any disruption will hit American high-tech companies as well. Apple draws 25% of its global net income from the greater China area, and the loss of the Chinese market could lead to 27,000 job losses and a stock market crash. Qualcomm even draws two thirds of its income from China. Its stock fell by 18% since the USTR announced the tariff measures. The seven leading American IT and telecom providers-HP, Dell, Microsoft, IBM, Intel, Cisco, and Unisys-got an average of 51% of their components from China during 2012-2017, according to a report requested by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Made in China 2025 will offer an even larger China market for world leading technology players. If they lose the China market, they can’t support the R&D in cutting edge technologies that’s critical to their future. Made in China 2025 is open to America and the rest of world. As stated by President Xi Jinping, China will further open up its manufacturing and services as soon as possible. The Chinese economy will grow by an aggregate of 50-60% over the next 8 years by 2025, meaning a tremendous new market, new industries, and new services, far outstripping the potential in any other part of the world. The Trump Administration should encourage the American business community ride on China’s coattails. WTO Rules-Based Talk the Only Solution The upcoming trade consultation is a step in the right direction. However, it must be based on WTO rules, and within WTO framework, not the Section 301 investigation and tariffs. President Trump has said that if no agreement is reached in the talks, the tariff measures will take effect by end of May as scheduled. In other words, the talk is under the shadow of tariffs. For President Trump, tariffs are a stick to use at the negotiation table, and trade war is a tool of trade policy. However, talking with China under a threat will not work. If the US tariff measures take effect, Chinese tariff measures will follow immediately, thus a trade war, a limited one, at least, will replace trade talks. The US trade team had better throw away any illusion that China would accept a moonshot agreement, giving up its Made in China 2025 plan. Only talks based on WTO rules can provide the common ground and common standard for both and lead to a balanced agreement. China and the US should strive for that end, which will be good for both countries, and for the whole world. China-US Focus， April 26, 2018

  2018年5月3日